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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Last year, in Crawford v. Washington,1 the U.S. Supreme Court overruled 
precedent,2 and held the standard for the admissibility of testimonial hearsay 
evidence under the Confrontation Clause3 is determined not by assessing its 
reliability, but by whether the witness is unavailable and whether the 
accused had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.4  However, the 
Court noted that there is one exception to the requirement of 
confrontation—the equitable doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.5  
Succinctly stated,6 that doctrine provides when the defendant has 
wrongfully caused the absence of a prosecution witness to prevent that 
witness from testifying at his trial, he cannot object to the admission of that 
witness’s extrajudicial statements because his confrontation objections to 
that evidence have been extinguished as a result of the his wrongful 
conduct. 7
 1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  Roberts held the Confrontation Clause 
does not bar the admission of an unavailable witness’s extrajudicial statement if the 
statement bears adequate indicia of reliability.  That means the statement must either 
come within a firmly rooted hearsay objection or have particular guarantees of 
trustworthiness.  Id. at 66. 
 3. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant 
part, that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with witnesses against him . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 4. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.  “Where testimonial evidence is at issue, 
however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability 
and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”  Id. at 68.  “Where testimonial statements 
are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is 
the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”  Id. at 68-69. 
 5. Id. at 62.  “In this respect, [the Roberts test of reliability] is very different from 
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that make no claim to be a surrogate means of 
assessing reliability.  For example, the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we 
accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not 
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 6. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, see 
Judge Joan Comparet-Cassani, Balancing the Anonymity of Threatened Witnesses Versus 
a Defendant’s Right of Confrontation: The Waiver Doctrine After Alvarado, 39 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV., 1165, 1217-43 (2002). 
 7. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878). 
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own 
wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted 
to supply the place of that which he has kept away.  The Constitution does not 
guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own 
wrongful acts.  It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the 
witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he 
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Following Crawford, the Second District and the Fourth District of the 
California Courts of Appeal applied the doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing to cases before them.8  Each case involved charges of 
murder and there was no evidence that the decedent was murdered 
specifically to prevent the person from testifying at the accused’s trial.  
Nevertheless, the Second District court in Giles opined that there is “no 
reason why the doctrine should be limited to such cases,” because the 
end result is the same, the exclusion of the prosecution witness’s 
inculpatory hearsay statements.9
The California Supreme Court has granted review in both cases.10  The 
issues to be addressed are: 
1. “Did defendant forfeit his Confrontation Clause claim 
regarding admission of the victim’s prior statements . . . under 
the doctrine of ‘forfeiture by wrongdoing’ because  defendant 
killed the victim, thus rendering her unavailable to testify at 
trial?”11 
cannot insist on his privilege.  If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, 
their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert 
that his constitutional rights have been violated. 
Id. 
 8. People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847 (Ct. App. 2004), review granted, 
102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004); People v. Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790, 796 (Ct. App. 2004), 
review granted, 103 P.3d 270 (Cal. 2004).   
 9. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 848 (explaining disagreement with the limitation 
suggested in United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
Although the opinion contains language suggesting that a killing must be 
motivated by a desire to silence the victim to trigger a forfeiture of the right of 
confrontation, we see no reason why the doctrine should be limited to such 
cases.  Forfeiture is a logical extension of the equitable principle that no person 
should benefit from his own wrongful acts.  A defendant whose intentional 
criminal act renders a witness unavailable for trial benefits from his crime if he 
can use the witness’ unavailability to exclude damaging hearsay statements by 
the witness that would otherwise be admissible.  This is so whether or not the 
defendant specifically intended to prevent the witness from testifying at the 
time he committed the act that rendered the witness unavailable. 
Id.  Discussion will center on the Giles opinion since the Court in Jiles did not discuss 
and analyze the reason for its conclusion that forfeiture applied.  Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
795-96. 
 10. Review was granted on December 22, 2004.  Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843 (Ct. 
App. 2004), review granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004); Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790 (Ct. 
App. 2004), review granted, 103 P.3d 270 (Cal. 2004). 
 11. Giles, 102 P.3d 930, 930 (Cal. 2004). 




2.  “Does the doctrine apply where the alleged ‘wrongdoing’ is 
the same as the offense for which defendant was on trial?”12 
The simple answer to both questions, as will be shown, is a qualified 
“no.”  The more complex answer to the first question is unless there is 
evidence that the murder of the decedent by the accused was motivated 
in part by a desire to silence the witness with the intent to deprive the 
prosecution of that witness’s testimony, the accused did not forfeit his 
Confrontation Clause objections.13
As to the second question, there must be some “wrongdoing” over and 
above, and other than the underlying crime in order for the doctrine to 
apply.  That wrongdoing requires a certain intent and a specific mental 
state or mens rea. 
In order to explain these answers, it will be necessary to explain the 
forfeiture doctrine, the equitable nature of the doctrine, and the relationship 
of the accused’s wrongdoing to the application of the doctrine.  This is 
an important doctrine, which has a significant role to play in criminal 
prosecution, but should not be extended when that extension would 
nullify its equitable nature.  Nor should it be extended such that the 
application of the doctrine would improperly extinguish a defendant’s 
constitutional right of confrontation. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING                                         
IS BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 
A.  The Original Formulation of the Forfeiture Doctrine 
1. Forfeiture Requires an Intentional Act Committed with the              
Intent to Prevent a Witness from Testifying at Trial 
The first discussion of the forfeiture doctrine by the U.S. Supreme 
Court was in Reynolds.14  That case involved a man who was charged 
with bigamy.15  An officer attempted to serve a subpoena on a wife of 
the accused to testify at his trial for the prosecution.  However, the 
defendant secreted her and refused to tell anyone where she was located, 
thus preventing service of the subpoena.16  After being informed of the 
accused’s actions, the trial court ruled that the unavailable witness’s 
former trial testimony would be admitted into evidence.17  On review, 
 12. Id.  
 13. United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1990); see United States 
v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 14. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 15. Id. at 153. 
 16. Id. at 159-60. 
 17. Id. at 160. 
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the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and justified the ruling on 
the basis of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should 
beconfronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his 
own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is 
admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away.  The Constitution 
does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his 
own wrongful acts.  It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the 
witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away he cannot 
insist on his privilege.  If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their 
evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his 
constitutional rights have been violated.18
It is clear from this statement that one requirement for the application 
of forfeiture is that it must be the defendant who is the cause of the 
witness’s non-attendance at trial.  The court’s use of the phrases “by his 
own wrongful procurement” and “he voluntarily keeps the [witness] 
away,” and the additional phrase “absent by his procurement,” support 
that conclusion.19
It is also clear that the defendant must intentionally, not accidentally 
or inadvertently, prevent the witness from attending the trial.  This conclusion 
follows from the Court’s language that the defendant “voluntarily keeps 
the [witness] away.”20  Impliedly, the Court requires that the defendant 
intentionally and freely chose to prevent the witness from attending and 
testifying at his trial, and directly caused the witness’s non-appearance. 
In addition, the language that competent evidence may be “admitted to 
supply the place of that which [the defendant] has kept away” indicates 
that the defendant has deliberately prevented the prosecution’s witness 
from attending trial with the specific intent that the prosecution be 
deprived of that witness’s inculpatory evidence.21
It is also the case that Reynolds characterizes the act which the 
defendant commits as one of “wrongful procurement” and “wrongful 
acts.”22  In Reynolds, that act was not telling the authorities the location 
of the witness so that the witness could be served with a subpoena to 
attend trial.  This is not criminal conduct, and the fact that the term used 
to describe that conduct is a word that has ethical overtones leads one to 
 18. Id. at 158 (emphasis added). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 




conclude that the type of conduct at issue for application of forfeiture 
need not be criminal.23  It is also the case that it is the wrongful 
procurement of the witness’s non-attendance that triggers application of 
the forfeiture doctrine, not the underlying crime.  Therefore, in order for 
the doctrine to apply, there must be an intentional act that is committed 
by the defendant that is other than the underlying criminal charge, and is 
committed with the specific intent to prevent the witness from testifying 
at trial. 
Finally, the Court concludes as a “consequence” of that wrongful act, 
the trial court may allow the prosecution to introduce other evidence in 
place of the live testimony of that witness, and the accused, by his 
conduct of preventing the witness’s attendance at trial, is precluded from 
objecting to the evidence on the basis of his constitutional right of 
confrontation.24  Therefore, it would appear that the Court has concluded 
that the accused is foreclosed from making a hearsay objection to the 
evidence offered to replace the live in-court testimony which is no 
longer available.  This conclusion necessarily follows from the language 
that “he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the 
place of that which he has kept away.”  It also follows that the Court 
finds a relinquishment of his right to confront and cross-examine the 
witness, since the Court uses the plural description when it states that 
“he cannot insist on his privilege” of being confronted with the 
witnesses against him since “he is in no condition to assert that his 
constitutional rights have been violated.”25  It appears that Reynolds 
concludes that one who has, by some wrongful conduct, intentionally 
and voluntarily procured a prosecution witness’s absence with the intent 
to prevent the appearance and testimony of the witness at trial, is 
precluded from raising an objection to the introduction of competent 
evidence meant to fill that void, because he has thereby lost the myriad 
rights included in the Sixth Amendment.  Thus, a defendant who 
procures a witness’s absence waives the right of confrontation for all 
purposes with regard to that witness. 
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause provides an accused with the 
right to confront at trial those witnesses who will offer testimony against him.  
Witnesses must come to court, appear before the trier of fact, swear under 
oath to tell the truth, and submit their testimony to cross-examination.26  The 
Clause thus provides a mechanism for obtaining reliable evidence.27
 23. Wrongful is defined as injurious, unjust, unfair, not rightful.  WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 2642 (Philip Babcock Gove ed. 1993). 
 24. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158. 
 25. Id. (emphasis added). 
 26. “The combined effect of these elements of confrontation—physical presence, 
oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact—serves the 
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The Confrontation Clause’s goal is to promote both the integrity of the 
fact finding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test 
adverse evidence, and a means to evaluate the truth of that testimony.28  
In this way, the Confrontation Clause simultaneously protects the 
accused by providing him with certain constitutional rights and also 
provides a procedure promotive of the ascertainment of truth.29
However, as Reynolds notes, when an accused voluntarily prevents the 
attendance of a prosecution witness at his trial he has deprived the 
prosecution of that live in-court testimony, prevented the trier of fact 
from seeing the witness and thus having a basis to judge his or her 
credibility, prevented the testing of that testimony by cross-examination, 
and affected the truth seeking function of the trial.30  His conduct is the 
direct cause of the prosecution having to resort to secondary evidence, 
extrajudicial statements, hearsay evidence, and prior testimony to 
replace that which the accused kept away. 
As Reynolds observes, because it is the defendant who has directly 
converted the probative damaging prosecution evidence into some form 
of hearsay evidence, he may not, cannot, and should not be allowed to 
object to the admission of that evidence on confrontation grounds.31  The 
relationship between the defendant’s wrongdoing to the hearsay status of 
the evidence is a direct causal relationship, not incidental, and is 
independent of the pending criminal charges.32  Indeed, the defendant’s 
purposes of the Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence admitted against an 
accused is reliable . . . .” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990). 
 27. “To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence . . . .” 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); “The Constitution prescribes a procedure 
for determining the reliability of testimony in criminal trials . . . .”  Id. at 67. 
 28. “[T]he Confrontation Clause has as a basic purpose the promotion of the 
‘integrity of the fact finding process.’”  White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (quoting 
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988)).  “[T]he mission of the Confrontation Clause 
is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in 
criminal trials by assuring that ‘the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating 
the truth of the prior statement.’”  Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (quoting 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)). 
 29. “The Confrontation Clause guarantees not only what it explicitly provides 
for—face to face confrontation—but also implied and collateral rights . . . .”  Maryland,  
497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 30. “The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of 
the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the 
context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 
116,  (1999) (quoting Maryland, 497 U.S. at 845). 
 31. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 32. For further discussion, see Part C. 




wrongdoing is the instrumentality for the prosecution’s need to use 
replacement evidence.  To allow a defendant to then challenge the 
admissibility of that evidence on the ground that his constitutional right 
to confront the witness has been violated would be to permit the accused 
to use his wrongdoing to gain a legal advantage, namely, to prevent the 
introduction of the prosecution’s damaging evidence.33
Of course, it is a legal fiction to say that one who interferes with a 
witness’s attendance at trial thereby knowingly, intelligently, and 
deliberately forfeits his right to exclude hearsay evidence.34  He simply 
does a wrongful act that has legal consequences that he may or may not 
foresee.  The connection between the defendant’s conduct and its legal 
consequences under the Confrontation Clause is supplied by the law and 
not by a purposeful decision by the defendant to forego a known 
constitutional right.35  A defendant’s actions that make it necessary for 
the government to use out-of-court statements is thus construed as a 
forfeiture of the protections afforded under the Confrontation Clause.36
Cross-examination has been described as the heart and core of the 
Sixth Amendment.37  However, when one wrongly procures the 
witness’s absence at trial, he has also prevented an opportunity to test 
the witness’s testimony by cross-examination.  As Reynolds explains, 
these rights have been forfeited as a result of the accused’s wrongdoing. 
2. The Forfeiture Doctrine is Based on the Equitable Principle That 
No One Shall Profit From His Wrongful Conduct 
The Reynolds Court explained that the basis for the application of the 
forfeiture doctrine is the equitable maxim that no one shall be allowed to 
take advantage of his own wrongful conduct.38
The [forfeiture doctrine] has its foundation in the maxim that no one shall be 
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong; and, consequently, if there has 
not been, in legal contemplation, a wrong committed, the way has not been 
 33. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878). 
 34. Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201 n.8 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 37. “Where testimonial evidence is at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands what 
the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”  
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).  In Crawford, admittance of a 
testimonial statement against the petitioner despite the lack of prior opportunity for 
cross-examination “alone [was] sufficient to make out a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.”  Id.  “Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his statements 
under oath . . . ; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the ‘greatest legal 
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth’ . . . .”  California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 
158 (1970) (quoting 5 Wigmore § 1367). 
 38. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3517 (1997) (“No one can take advantage of his 
own wrong.”). 
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opened for the introduction of the testimony.  We are content with this long-
established usage, which, so far as we have been able to discover, has rarely 
been departed from.  It is  the outgrowth of a maxim based on the principles of 
common honesty, and, if properly administered, can harm no one.39
As the Court clearly states, the condition precedent, or the necessary 
event that must occur before the doctrine may be invoked, is that a 
wrong must have been committed.40  Unless a wrong has been 
committed according to Reynolds, there is no legal foundation which 
would allow one to introduce secondary evidence.  First, there must be a 
wrongful act, and that act must have been performed with a certain 
motive or intent, namely, to remove an adverse witness from the 
prosecution’s case.  Second, one must look at the result of that act.  If, as 
a result of that wrongful conduct, one would gain a legal advantage that 
otherwise would not be available, then the forfeiture doctrine applies.  
Otherwise, one would be allowed to gain an advantage by dishonesty or 
chicanery, or by some other unethical conduct.  Moreover, because the 
criminal law does not, generally speaking, involve itself in ethics, one 
must look to equitable jurisdiction to resolve the issue. 
Equity is a system of jurisprudence independent of, and collateral to 
civil and criminal law.41  It is concerned with doing what is just, fair, and 
right according to its rules and principles.42  Equity is concerned with 
 39. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878) (emphasis added). 
 40. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458 (1912). 
The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused person, placed 
upon trial for crime and protected by all the safeguards with which the 
humanity of our present criminal law sedulously surrounds him, can with 
impunity defy the processes of that law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and 
juries, and turn them into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society, for its 
own safety, to restrict the operation of the principle of personal liberty.  
Neither in criminal law nor in civil cases will the law allow a person to take 
advantage of his own wrong. 
Id. (quoting Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446, 460 (1899)). 
 41. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 484 (5th ed. 1979) (“A system of jurisprudence 
collateral to, and in some respects independent of, ‘law’; the object of which is to render 
the administration of justice more complete, by affording relief where the courts of law 
are incompetent to give it. . . .”). 
 42. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 484 (5th ed. 1979). 
Justice administered according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly 
formulated rules of common law.  It is based on a system of rules and 
principles which originated in England as an alternative to the harsh rules of 
common law and which were based on what was fair in a particular situation.  
One sought relief under this system in courts of equity rather than in courts of 
law.  The term “equity” denotes the spirit and habit of fairness, justness and 
right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men. (citation 




what ought to be the case according to what is ethically and morally 
correct.43
Courts of equity historically are concerned with enforcing the requirements 
of conscience and good faith.44  Equity requires that litigants “shall have 
acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue.”45  
Courts of equity thus have a wide range of discretion in refusing to aid 
those who have by their acts, violated that which is right or just.46  
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court’s comments about the equitable doctrine of 
clean hands are relevant.47
Accordingly one’s misconduct need not necessarily have been of such a nature 
as to be punishable as a crime or as to justify legal proceedings of any character.  
Any willful act concerning the cause of action which rightfully can be said to 
transgress equitable standards of conduct is sufficient cause for the invocation 
of the maxim . . . .48
Equity has as its object “to render the administration of justice more 
complete, by affording relief where the courts of law are incompetent to 
give it.”49
“[E]quity” in its “broadest and most general signification . . . denotes the spirit 
and habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the 
intercourse of men with men. . . .  [I]n this sense its obligation is ethical rather 
than jural, and its discussion belongs to the sphere of morals.  It is grounded in 
the precepts of the conscience, not in any sanction of positive law.”  . . . “In a 
restricted sense, the word denotes equal and impartial justice . . .; justice that is 
ascertained by natural reason or ethical insight, but independent of the 
formulated body of law.”50
In other words, equity comes into play and offers relief when there is 
none available in a court of law.  The corollary to this rule is that “there 
is no right to equitable relief when there is an adequate remedy at law.”51
omitted.)  Equity is a body of jurisprudence . . . differing in its origin, theory, 
and methods from the common law; though procedurally . . . equitable and 
legal rights and remedies are administered in the same court. 
Id. 
 43. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 44. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 
(1945). 
 45. Id. at 814-15. 
 46. Id. at 815 (“This maxim necessarily gives wide range to the equity court’s use 
of discretion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant.”). 
 47. The doctrine is relevant because “[t]he [forfeiture doctrine] is also based on a 
principle of reciprocity similar to the equitable doctrine of clean hands.”  Steele v. 
Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 48. Precision Instrument Mfg., 324 U.S. at 815. 
 49. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 484 (5th ed. 1979). 
 50. Gilles v. Dep’t of Human Res. Dev., 521 P.2d 110, 116 n.10 (Cal. 1974) 
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 634 (4th ed. 1957)). 
 51. 11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 681 (1990). 
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Equity jurisdiction is the power to . . . decide [causes] in accordance with the 
doctrines and rules of equity jurisprudence. . . .  In order that a cause may come 
within the scope of the equity jurisdiction . . . the remedy granted must be in its 
nature purely equitable, or . . . it must be one which under the facts and 
circumstances of the case, can only be made complete and adequate through the 
equitable modes of procedure.52
Equity acts specifically in that it grants specific relief directed against 
the person.53  When a party to a proceeding or action has behaved in a 
way that violates the common sense notions of honesty and fair dealing, 
then relief may be obtained that is characteristic of a court of equity.54
“[W]henever a party who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in 
motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other 
equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be shut 
against him in limine; the court will refuse to interfere on his behalf, to  
acknowledge his right, or to award him any remedy.”55
The “very foundation of an equity forum is good conscience,” and 
“any really unconscientious conduct connected with the controversy to 
which he is a party is sufficient justification for the court to close its 
doors to him.”56
Thus, the forfeiture doctrine is an equitable punishment, a reprimand, 
and an equitable penalty.57  Because equity requires that parties “shall 
have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in 
issue,” when a party to an action willfully “transgress[es] the equitable 
 52. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 485 (5th ed. 1979). 
 53. 11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 680 (1990). 
 54. “[I]t is the duty of a court of equity, upon any suggestion that a plaintiff has 
not acted in good faith concerning the matters upon which he bases his suit, to inquire 
into the facts in that regard.  For it is not only fraud or illegality which will prevent a 
suitor from obtaining equitable relief.  Any unconscientious conduct . . . will repel him 
from the forum whose very foundation is good conscience.”  DeGarmo v. Goldman, 123 
P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1942). 
 55. Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933) 
(quoting POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed. 1905, § 397); DeGarmo, 123 P.2d at 
6 (quoting Allstead v. Laumeister, 116 P. 296, 297 (1911)). 
 56. DeGarmo, 123 P.2d at 6. 
 57. A court of equity, historically, is “a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the 
requirements of conscience and good faith.”  Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. 
Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945).  Natural equity is “used as equivalent to 
justice, honesty, or morality . . . , or man’s innate sense of right dealing and fair play. . . .   
[It] may be understood to denote . . . that which strikes the ordinary conscience and sense 
of justice as being fair, right, and equitable . . . .”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 484 (5th 
ed. 1979). 




standards of conduct” a court of equity will prevent the “wrongdoer 
from enjoying the fruits of his transgression.”58
If an accused uses either threats, intimidation, persuasion, fear or 
murder to prevent a prosecution witness from appearing in court and 
testifying before a jury, he has prevented the prosecution from presenting 
live testimony, which is favored under the law.59  The accused himself 
has prevented a setting where he can exercise his Sixth Amendment 
right to cross-examine the witness.  Instead, because of his conduct, the 
government is forced to resort to out-of-court statements as proof of the 
underlying charges. 
Under the rules of evidence, because the replacement statement was 
made out of court, and therefore is hearsay, and because the defendant 
cannot cross-examine the witness because he or she is unavailable, the 
accused would normally have the right under the law to raise those 
objections to the admission of that extrajudicial evidence.  However, if 
the accused’s objections to the hearsay evidence would be allowed, he 
would have used his Confrontation Clause rights as a sword to cut away 
the heart of the prosecution’s case.  The accused would have used those 
safeguards put in place for his protection to achieve a legal advantage 
which would be available to him only because of his wrongful conduct. 
He would have kept out damaging inculpatory evidence, compromised 
the truth seeking function of the trial court, and used the constitutional 
rights meant for his protection to slice away the heart of the prosecution’s 
case.  It is at this point that the equitable doctrine of forfeiture comes 
into play to prevent the accused from profiting from his miscreant 
conduct. 
The defendant who has removed an adverse witness from trial through 
the use of threats, violence, or murder is in a weak position to complain 
about losing the chance to cross-examine the witness.60  In addition, 
where a defendant has silenced a prosecution witness through the use of 
threats, violence, or murder, admission of the witness’s prior statement 
“at least partially offsets the perpetrator’s rewards for his misconduct.”61  
Therefore, one who wrongfully procures the absence of a witness may 
not assert any confrontation rights as to that witness.62
 58. Precision Instrument Mfg., 324 U.S. at 814-15. 
 59. Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. White, 
116 F.3d. 903, 911-12 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 60. United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 652 (2d Cir. 2001); White, 116 F.3d at 
911. 
 61. White, 116 F.3d at 911. 
 62. Id.  “[A] defendant should not be afforded the protection of the [C]onfrontation 
[C]lause if he achieves his objective of silencing a witness . . . .”  United States v. 
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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“The right of confrontation is so fundamental to our concept of a fair 
trial that it is a privilege specifically guaranteed by the Constitution.  
When confrontation becomes impossible due to the actions of the very 
person who would assert the right logic dictates that the right has been 
waived.”63  The law simply cannot countenance a defendant deriving 
benefits from silencing the chief witness against him.64  “To permit such 
subversion of a criminal prosecution ‘would be contrary to public policy, 
common sense, and the underlying purpose of the [C]onfrontation 
[C]lause,’ and make a mockery of the system of justice that the right was 
designed to protect.”65  Therefore, in that instance the equitable doctrine 
of forfeiture penalizes the accused and declares that “he cannot insist on 
his privilege” under the Confrontation Clause.66
B.  The Doctrine Has Been Followed and Extended                                          
in the Federal Courts 
Since Reynolds, a number of federal courts have applied the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in cases where the defendant has 
wrongfully procured a witness’s silence through murder, intimidation, 
threats, violence, kidnapping, or other means to prevent the witness’s 
testimony at trial.67
 63. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (quoting United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976)); 
accord United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 66. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878). 
 67. Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 231-36, 249-53 (2d Cir. 2003) (intimidation); 
Magouirk v. Warden, Winn Corr. Ctr., 237 F.3d 549, 552-54 (5th Cir. 2001) (threats); 
United States v. Johnson,  219 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2000) (murder); United States v. 
Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 814-21 (10th Cir. 2000) (threatening a witness’s life); Geraci v. 
Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6, 9-10 (2d Cir. 2000) (threats against witness and witness’s family 
made on behalf of defendant); United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 925-27 (8th Cir. 
1999) (murder); Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 361-62 (5th Cir. 1998) (threats); 
United States v. White, 116 F.3d. 903, 911-16 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (witness absence 
procured by murder); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 667-69 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(murder); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1278-81 (1st Cir. 1996) (murder of a 
potential witness); United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 798, 814-15 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(murder); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47-48  (2d Cir. 1992) (threatening 
letters); Bagby v. Kuhlman, 932 F.2d 131, 135-37 (2d Cir. 1991) (threats and acts of 
violence); Rouco, 765 F.2d at 983, 995 (murder); United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 
784, 788-89  (2d Cir. 1984) (threats); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 270-73 
(2d Cir. 1982) (murder); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1200-03 (6th Cir. 1982) (use of 
influence and control to silence witness); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 621, 630-32 
(5th Cir. 1982) (murder); United States v. Balano 618 F.2d 624, 625-30 (10th Cir. 1979) 




Courts who have employed the forfeiture doctrine have also found that 
a defendant’s “misconduct waived not only their confrontation rights but 
also their hearsay objections, thus rendering a special finding of reliability 
superfluous.”68  In fact, once the confrontation right is extinguished by 
operation of the defendant’s forfeiture of that right, the balance tips in 
favor of the need for that evidence.69
The doctrine has also been expanded to allow extrajudicial statements 
other than prior trial testimony, such as statements made to the police by 
the unavailable witness,70 statements made to a third party by the slain 
witness,71 and grand jury testimony.72
Additionally, the forfeiture doctrine has been codified into a Federal 
Rule of Evidence.  Rule 804, subdivision (b), of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence provides: 
 
Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable 
. . . .  
 
(b) Hearsay exceptions: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if 
the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
. . . . 
 
(6) Forfeiture by wrongdoing.  A statement offered against a party that has 
engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure 
the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.73
 
The Advisory Committee Notes provide that the rule was promulgated 
in response to the prophylactic need “to deal with abhorrent behavior 
(threatening witness’s life); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355-60 (8th Cir. 
1976) (intimidation); United States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 399, 426-27 (E.D. Va. 
2002) (murder).  Wrongful conduct includes the use of force, coercion, threats, 
persuasion, and control of a witness by a defendant, the willful nondisclosure of 
information, a defendant’s direction to a witness to exercise the Fifth Amendment 
privilege and murder.  Steele,  684 F.2d at 1201.  But see United States v. Ochoa, 229 
F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2000) (permitting witness to use phone alone is not sufficient and 
conduct is not wrongful if did not know was helping procure unavailability). 
 68. Miller, 116 F.3d at 668; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1281; Thai, 29 F.3d at 814; see 
also United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 652 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 69. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1281. 
 70. Emery, 186 F.3d at 925-27; White, 116 F.3d at 910-11; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 
1278; Thai, 29 F.3d at 814; Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 46-47; Rouco, 765 F.2d at 994-95; 
Steele, 684 F.2d at 1199-1202. 
 71. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 650-52; United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 355 (4th 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 72. Geraci v. Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6, 9-10 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 788-89 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 
627-30 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272-73 (2d Cir. 
1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 630 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 73. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
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‘which strikes at the heart of the system of justice itself.’”74  The 
Committee also observed that the act of wrongdoing need not be a 
criminal act.75  Additionally, the statute has been interpreted to require a 
finding that the defendant committed the wrongful act with the intention 
of making the declarant unavailable as a witness.76
Some courts have applied the forfeiture doctrine when the unavailable 
witness is also the victim of one of the criminal charges.77  The 
prosecution is not required to show that the defendant’s sole motivation 
in murdering the witness was to procure the declarant’s absence at trial.  
Rather, it need only show that the defendant was motivated at least in 
part by a desire to silence the witness.78
 74. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee’s note (quoting Mastrangelo, 693 
F.2d at 273). 
 75. Id.; see also United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 639 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 76. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 652 (“By its plain terms, Rule 804(b)(6) refers to the 
intent of a party to procure the unavailability of the witness, and does not . . . limit the 
subject matter of the witness’ testimony . . . .” (first emphasis added)); Magouirk v. 
Warden, Winn Corr. Ctr., 237 F.3d 549, 554 (5th Cir. 2001) (“It is not so much the 
severity of the behavior [murdering a witness] but rather the intent underlying it and its 
effect that constitutes a waiver.”); Johnson, 219 F.3d at 355-56 (“The district court 
appears to have admitted Thomas’ hearsay because, inter alia, Raheem forfeited his 
hearsay objections, under Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(6) by having caused the unavailability of 
Thomas as a witness. . . .  Here, Raheem murdered Thomas at least in part to procure the 
unavailability of the only witness to his murder of Antonio Stevens.”); United States v. 
Emery, 186 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Instead, [FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)] establishes the 
general proposition that a defendant may not benefit from his or her wrongful prevention 
of future testimony from a witness or potential witness.”). 
 77. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 651-52; Johnson, 219 F.3d at 355; Emery, 186 F.3d at  
926; United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814-15 
(2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 627, 630 (5th Cir. 1982); see United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 
641, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 78. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 654 (quoting Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279) (“The 
government need not, however, show that the defendant’s sole motivation was to procure 
the declarant’s absence; rather it need only show that the defendant ‘was motivated in 
part by a desire to silence the witness.’”); Johnson, 219 F.3d at 356 (“Here, Raheem 
murdered Thomas at least in part to procure the unavailability of the only witness to his 
murder of Antonio Stevens.”); Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279 (“Thus, a defendant who 
wrongfully procures a witness’s absence for the purpose of denying the government that 
witness’s testimony waives his right under the Confrontation Clause to object to the 
admission of the absent witness’s hearsay statements. . . .  Moreover, it is sufficient in 
this regard to show that the evildoer was motivated in part by a desire to silence the 
witness; the intent to deprive the prosecution of testimony need not be the actor’s sole 
motivation.”); Thai, 29 F.3d at 815 (“In the present case, the district court held such a 
hearing and found . . . . that Thai and Lan Tran ‘caused the unavailability of the witness 




Courts have also extended the forfeiture doctrine to cases where at the 
time of the murder of the individual there were no criminal charges 
pending.  Although this time period would be pretrial, courts have 
nevertheless applied the doctrine even though confrontation is a trial 
right.79  The rationale for this extension is well explained in Houlihan: 
When a defendant murders an individual who is a percipient witness to acts of 
criminality (or procures his demise) in order to prevent him from appearing at 
an upcoming trial, he denies the government the benefit of the witness’s live 
testimony.  In much the same way, when a defendant murders such a witness (or 
procures his demise) in order to prevent him from assisting an ongoing criminal 
investigation, he is denying the government the benefit of the witness’s live 
testimony at a future trial. . . .  [A]s long as it is reasonably foreseeable that the  
investigation will culminate in the bringing of charges, the mere fact that the 
homicide occurs at an earlier step in the pavane should not affect the 
operation of the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine.  Indeed, adopting the 
contrary position . . . would serve as a prod to the unscrupulous to accelerate the 
timetable and murder suspected snitches sooner rather than later.  We see no 
justification for creating such a perverse incentive, or for distinguishing 
between a defendant who assassinates a witness on the eve of trial and a 
potential defendant who assassinates a potential witness before charges 
officially have been brought. In either case, it is the intent to silence that 
provides notice.80
Finally, the forfeiture doctrine has also been applied when one of the 
members of a conspiracy has wrongfully procured a witness’s 
unavailability.81  The forfeiture doctrine applied to a defendant who 
acquiesced in the wrongful procurement of the witness’s unavailability, 
but did not actually engage in the wrongdoing apart from the conspiracy 
itself based on an agency theory of responsibility.82
C. The Giles Extension Ignores the Equitable Basis of the Forfeiture 
Doctrine and Violates Confrontation Clause Guarantees 
1. Application of the Forfeiture Doctrine Requires                                     
an Intentional Act and a Mens Rea 
In Giles, the defendant was convicted of the murder of his ex-girlfriend.83  
A couple of weeks before the murder, the police were called out to 
[Sen Van Ta] and that he was made unavailable to prevent him from being a potential 
witness.’”). 
 79. Dhinsa,  243 F.3d at 652 (quoting Miller, 116 F.3d at 1279-80); United States 
v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 813-15 (10th Cir. 2000); White, 116 F.3d at 911; Miller, 116 
F.3d at 667-68; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279-80 . 
 80. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279-80. 
 81. Thai, 29 F.3d at 815. 
 82. Id. at 816. 
 83. People v. Giles, 19 Cal Rptr. 3d 843, 845 (Ct. App. 2004), review granted, 102 
P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004). 
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investigate a report of domestic violence between the same two people.84  
At trial, the prosecution was permitted to introduce into evidence prior 
statements the murder victim made to the police during the domestic 
violence investigation.  The decedent had told the police that the 
defendant had threatened to kill her.85  The trial court ruled the statement 
admissible under Evidence Code section 1370.86
After Giles was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the decision 
in Crawford which held that testimonial evidence, which includes 
“statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations”87 is 
inadmissible unless the declarant was unavailable and the defendant had 
 84. Id. at 846. 
 85. Id. (“After [the decedent] broke free again, appellant opened a folding knife, 
held it about three feet away from her, and said, ‘If I catch you fucking around I’ll kill 
you.’”). 
 86. Id.  Section 1370 of the California Evidence Code provides: 
(a) Evidence of a statement by a declarant is not made inadmissible by 
the hearsay rule if all of the following conditions are met: 
(1)  The statement purports to narrate, describe, or explain the 
infliction or threat of physical injury upon the declarant. 
(2) The declarant is unavailable as a witness pursuant to Section 
240. 
(3) The statement was made at or near the time of the infliction or 
threat of physical injury.  Evidence of statements made more 
than five years before the filing of the current action or 
proceeding shall be inadmissible under this section. 
(4) The statement was made under circumstances that would 
indicate its trustworthiness. 
(5) The statement was made in writing, was electronically recorded, 
or made to a physician, nurse, paramedic, or to a law enforcement 
official. 
(b) For purposes of paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), circumstances 
relevant to the issue of trustworthiness include, but are not limited to, 
the following: 
(1) Whether the statement was made in contemplation of pending 
or anticipated litigation in which the declarant was interested. 
(2) Whether the declarant has a bias or motive for fabricating the 
statement, and the extent of any bias or motive. 
(3) Whether the statement is corroborated by evidence other than 
statements that are admissible only pursuant to this section. 
(c) A statement is admissible pursuant to this section only if the 
proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse party the 
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement 
sufficiently in advance of the proceedings in order to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement. 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (1995). 
 87. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). 




an opportunity to cross-examine him.88  On appeal in California, the 
defendant in Giles claimed that the admission of the decedent’s 
extrajudicial statement violated his right of confrontation under 
Crawford.89  However, the court of appeal decided that whether the 
statement was testimonial was irrelevant since the statement was 
admissible within the dictates of Crawford pursuant to the forfeiture 
doctrine.90  The defendant objected to the application of the doctrine on 
the grounds that there was no evidence that he wrongfully procured the 
decedent’s “absence from trial with the intent of preventing testimony 
about that crime.”  The court disagreed that the absence of that evidence 
prevented application of the forfeiture doctrine.91
Although [Houlihan] contains language suggesting that a killing must be 
motivated by a desire to silence the victim to trigger a forfeiture of the right of 
confrontation, we see no reason why the doctrine should be limited to such 
cases.  Forfeiture is a logical extension of the equitable principle that no person 
should benefit from his own wrongful acts.  A defendant whose intentional 
criminal act renders a witness unavailable for trial benefits from his crime if he 
can use the witness’s unavailability to exclude damaging hearsay statements by 
the witness that would otherwise be admissible.  This is so whether or not the 
defendant specifically intended to prevent the witness from testifying at the time 
he committed the act that rendered the witness unavailable.92
The appellate court concluded that in a case where the murder victim 
is the declarant of the extrajudicial statement, it is irrelevant whether the 
murder was committed for the purpose of preventing that witness’s live 
testimony in court because the end result is the same without that intent 
in that the prosecution is deprived of that witness’s live testimony.93
The Giles court bolstered this conclusion by adding certain safeguards 
to narrow the holding.94  First, the statement must come within a recognized 
hearsay exception;95 second, the act must be an intentional criminal 
act;96 third, the trial court should not apply the doctrine if it would be 
inequitable to do so;97 fourth, the fact of forfeiture must be proved by 
clear and convincing evidence;98 and fifth, the jury shall not be advised 
of the forfeiture finding.99
 88. Id. at 53-54. 
 89. Giles, 19 Cal Rptr. 3d at 846-47. 
 90. Id. at 847. 
 91. Id. at 848. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 849. 
 94. Id. at 850-51. 
 95. Id. at 850 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 851. 
 99. Id. 
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The Giles court’s attempt to limit the application of the forfeiture 
doctrine was ineffective.100  First, whether an extrajudicial statement comes 
within a hearsay exception is irrelevant.101  As stated earlier, forfeiture is 
an equitable reprimand.  Application of that doctrine extinguishes all 
Confrontation Clause rights.102  Ergo, a hearsay objection is not available 
once the forfeiture doctrine applies.103  Second, the requirement that the 
wrongful act be an intentional criminal act104 is inconsistent with 
Reynolds,105 the Federal Rules of Evidence,106 federal precedent,107 and 
the equitable foundation for the doctrine.108
 100. Id. at 850. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004); United States v. Thai, 29 
F.3d 785, 814 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982); 
United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. 
Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A defendant who procures a witness’s absence 
waives the right of confrontation for all purposes with regard to that witness, not just to 
the admission of sworn hearsay statements.” (emphasis added)). 
 103. United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting FED. R. 
EVID. 804(b)(6)) (“Hearsay objections are similarly forfeited under Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(6), which excludes from the prohibition on hearsay any ‘statement offered against 
a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, 
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.’”); United States v. Houlihan, 92 
F.3d 1271, 1281 (1st Cir. 1996) (“On the facts of this case, we agree with the district 
court that Houlihan’s and Nardone’s misconduct waived not only their confrontation 
rights but also their hearsay objections, thus rendering a special finding of reliability 
superfluous.”); Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47 (“A defendant who procures a witness’s absence 
waives the right of confrontation for all purposes with regard to that witness, not just to 
the admission of sworn hearsay statements.” (emphasis added)); Thevis, 665 F.2d at 632 
(“[W]aiver of one’s right to confrontation [is] a fortiori a waiver of one’s right to raise a 
hearsay objection.”); Balano, 618 F.2d at 626 (“However the [trial] court held that 
Balano had effectively waived his right to confront Carillo by threatening his life. . . .  A 
valid waiver of the constitutional right is a fortiori a valid waiver of an objection under 
the rules of evidence.”); accord United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 655 (2d Cir. 
2001) (quoting Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1281); Thai, 29 F.3d at 814; United States v. 
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 104. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 850. 
 105. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878) (“The Constitution does 
not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own 
wrongful acts.” (emphasis added )). 
 106. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
 107. “Accordingly one’s misconduct need not necessarily have been of such nature 
as to be punishable as a crime. . . .”  Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. 
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945) (discussing the doctrine of clean hands); 
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273-74 (bare knowledge of a plot to kill a prosecution witness 
and a failure to give warning to appropriate authorities found to be a waiver); accord 
United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 819 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 108. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159 (“[The forfeiture doctrine] is the outgrowth of a 
maxim based on the [principle] of common honesty. . . .”). 




Clearly, one may procure a witness’s unavailability by means other 
than a criminal act.  For example, forfeiture should apply if an accused, 
or one at his behest, convinces a prosecution witness not to testify and 
buys the witness an out-of-country plane ticket.  Even though such 
conduct is not criminal, it certainly comes within the purview of the 
forfeiture doctrine.  Likewise, the defendant in Reynolds, who refused to 
divulge the whereabouts of the prosecution witness, did not commit a 
criminal act, but nevertheless committed a wrongful act.109  In fact, the 
great weight of authority finds that wrongful conduct may include 
noncriminal conduct such as chicanery, intimidation, threats, persuasion, 
dominance, or control by defendant, as well as criminal conduct.110
Wrongful conduct obviously includes the use of force and threats, but it has also 
been held to include persuasion and control by a defendant, the wrongful  
nondisclosure of information, and a defendant’s direction of a witness to 
exercise the [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege.111
As one Court has said, “[i]t is not so much the severity of the 
behavior, but rather the intent underlying it and its effectiveness, that 
constitutes a waiver.”112
Third, the limitation that “the trial court cannot apply the doctrine 
when it would be unjust to do so” is an inherent and intrinsic aspect of 
the equitable doctrine of forfeiture and thus fails to limit its 
application.113  Fourth, the requirement that forfeiture be proven by clear 
and convincing evidence deals only with the burden of proof and thus is 
irrelevant as to whether the doctrine ought to apply.114  Moreover, this 
requirement conflicts with the Federal Rules of Evidence115 and federal 
precedent which requires proof by preponderance of the evidence.116  
Finally, the requirement that the jury not be advised of a forfeiture 
finding does not limit its application.117  In all hearings held outside the 
 109. Id. at 159-60. 
 110. United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 651 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 639 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 
(D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996); 
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272-73; Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201 (6th Cir. 1982); 
United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 628-29 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346,1358 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 111. Steele, 684 F.2d at 1201. 
 112. Magouirk v. Warden, Winn Corr. Ctr., 237 F.3d 549, 554 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(emphasis added). 
 113. People v. Giles, 19 Cal Rptr. 3d 843, 850 (Ct. App. 2004), review granted, 102 
P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004). 
 114. Id. at 851. 
 115. See supra notes 73, 74 and accompanying text. 
 116. See United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 815 (10th Cir. 2000); Comparet-Cassani, 
supra note 6, at 1221, 1221 n.360.   
 117. Giles, 19 Cal Rptr. 3d at 851. 
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presence of a jury, the trial court does not inform the jury of the legal 
ruling, but simply either admits or does not admit the item into 
evidence.118  Therefore, this requirement would add nothing as far as 
limiting the application of the forfeiture doctrine. 
Moreover, the application and extension of the forfeiture doctrine in 
this manner is inconsistent with its equitable nature, conflicts with the 
constitutional guarantees of confrontation, conflicts with the federal rule 
which codified the doctrine, and conflicts with the federal courts to date 
that have applied the doctrine.119
As stated earlier, the forfeiture doctrine is based on principles of 
honesty and wrongful conduct.120  According to Reynolds, in order for 
the equitable doctrine to apply to a pending cause of action the defendant 
must have committed a wrongful act and that act must have been 
accompanied by a certain mens rea, that is to say, an intent to prevent the 
prosecution witness from testifying at trial.121  This factor is consistent 
with the requirement that for equity jurisdiction to apply an accused 
must have committed an unconscionable act with respect to his pending 
case in order to obtain an unfair advantage.122 In other words, there must 
be a violation of an equitable nature for the court to provide an equitable 
remedy.123
 118. CAL. EVID. CODE § 402(b) (1995). 
 119. See supra notes 7, 13, 67, 69-76.  The same argument that the Giles Court 
made to extend the forfeiture doctrine to cases where there is no evidence that the 
defendant committed the act with the intent to prevent the witness’s testimony at trial 
was presented in another case and rejected.  See United States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 
399, 426 (E.D. Va. 2002) (rejecting the argument that “the Court should allow the 
evidence to be conditionally admitted, and defer the ultimate ruling until sometime 
during trial”). 
 120. See supra notes 38, 39. 
 121. See supra note 7. 
 122. Upon the second issue of good faith, the court made no finding although it  
 is the duty of a court of equity, upon any suggestion that a plaintiff has 
not acted in good faith concerning the matters upon which he bases his 
suit, to inquire into the facts in that regard.  For it is not only fraud or 
illegality which will prevent a suitor from obtaining equitable relief.  Any 
unconscientious conduct upon his part which is connected with the 
controversy will repel him from the forum whose very foundation is good 
conscience.
DeGarmo v. Goldman, 123 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1942) (citing Johnson v. Murphy 172 P. 616, 
617 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1918). 
 123. Id.  “‘[W]henever a party, who, . . . seeks to set the judicial machinery in 
motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience or good faith, or other 
equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be shut against 




Any willful act concerning the cause of action which rightfully can be said to 
transgress equitable standards of conduct is sufficient for the invocation of the 
maxim by the chancellor.124
Courts of equity decide such issues according to their own doctrine 
and rules of jurisprudence, which is collateral to and independent of 
criminal law.  The objective is to render relief which would otherwise be 
unavailable.125  Indeed, a basic rule limiting equity jurisdiction is that 
“there is no right to equitable relief or to an equitable remedy when there 
is an adequate remedy at law.”126  Rules of equity cannot be used to 
intrude on matters which are fully covered by statutes.127  This is 
especially true since the equitable doctrine of forfeiture, like other 
maxims, addresses a normative issue, namely, whether one ought to 
benefit from his wrongdoing.  Therefore, it is a quasi-ethical inquiry and 
not one concerned with violations of criminal law which is covered by 
the Penal Code, case law, and the Constitution. 
‘[E]quity’ in its broadest and most general signification, . . . denotes the spirit 
and heart of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the 
intercourse of men with men. . . .  In this sense its obligation is ethical rather 
than jural, and its discussion belongs to the sphere of morals.  It is grounded in 
the precepts of the conscience, not in any sanction of positive law. . . .  In a 
restricted sense, the word denotes equal and impartial justice . . . ; justice, that 
is, as ascertained by natural reason or ethical insight, but independent of the 
formulated body of law.128
Therefore, there must be something other than, and in addition to, the 
act underlying the criminal charge, but related to that charge, which 
transgresses equitable standards of conduct in order for the forfeiture 
doctrine to apply.129  Of course, the conduct underlying the criminal 
him in limine . . . .’”  Id. (quoting Allstead v. Laumeister, 116 P. 296, 297 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1911)). 
 124. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 
(1945) (emphasis added). 
 125. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 484 (5th ed. 1979). 
 126. 11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 681 (1990). 
 127. Id. at 682. 
 128. Gilles v. Dep’t of Human Res. Dev., 521 P.2d 110, 116 n.10 (Cal. 1974) 
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 634 (4th ed. 1957)). 
 129. “Any willful act concerning the cause of action which rightfully can be said to 
transgress equitable standards of conduct is sufficient cause for the invocation of the 
maxim by the chancellor.”  Precision Instrument Mfg., 324 U.S. at 815; “A court of 
equity acts only when and as conscience commands . . . .”  Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. 
Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933). 
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charge may be part of the misconduct, as for example, if the defendant 
murdered a witness for the prosecution with the intent to prevent that 
individual from testifying at trial.130  This combination of the mens rea 
and wrongful act would then confer equitable jurisdiction on the parties.  
The reason is that if the defendant succeeded in preventing any 
inculpatory extrajudicial statements from being received into evidence, 
he would have thwarted the normal operation of the criminal justice 
system by virtue of his wrongful act.131  To permit a defendant to profit 
from that motive would be “contrary to public policy, common sense, 
and the underlying purpose of the [C]onfrontation [C]lause.”132
The Sixth Amendment does not stand as a shield to protect the accused from his 
own misconduct or chicanery. . . . A defendant who murders a witness ought not 
be permitted to invoke the right of  confrontation to prohibit the use of his 
accusation. . . . Similarly, a defendant should not be afforded the protection of 
the [C]onfrontation [C]lause if he achieves his objective of silencing a witness 
by less drastic, but equally effective, means. . . .  The defendant cannot now be 
heard to complain that he was denied the right of cross-examination and 
confrontation when he himself was the instrument of the denial. . . . Naturally, 
considerations of public policy and effective administration of justice enter into 
the resolution of issues of this type.  The law will not place its imprimatur on the 
practice of threatening Government witnesses into not testifying at trial and 
courts should not permit the accused to derive any direct or tangential benefit 
from such conduct.133
For these reasons, it is necessary that in addition to an act which 
prevented a witness from attending trial and testifying committed by the 
defendant or at his behest, there must have existed an intent that the act 
was committed for that purpose.  Without the presence of that intent 
there is no legal justification for the equitable reprimand. 
[Courts of Equity] apply the maxim . . . only where some unconscionable act 
of one coming for relief has immediate and necessary relation to the equity he 
seeks in respect of the matter in litigation.  They do not close their doors 
because of plaintiff’s misconduct . . . that has no relation to anything involved 
in the suit, but only for such violations of conscience as in some measure affect 
the equitable relations between the parties in respect of something brought 
before the court for adjudication. 
Id. 
 130. United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 909-11 (D.C. Cir. 1997); e.g., United 
States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 131. See White, 116 F.3d at 911. 
 132. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 133. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 




2.  The Wrongful Act Need Not Be Criminal 
Moreover, the act which prevents the person from attending trial, need 
not be one which is criminal in nature.134  Neither the Federal Rules of 
Evidence,135 nor the federal cases which have applied forfeiture require 
that the act be criminal.136
The waiver doctrine was promulgated in 1997 as a Federal Rule of 
Evidence.137  The advisory committee notes explained that the doctrine 
applies to those who commit an act, which need not be criminal, but is 
committed with the intention that the declarant will not be available as a 
witness at the wrongdoer’s trial. 
Rule 804(b)(6) has been added to provide that a party forfeits the right to object 
on hearsay grounds to the admission of a declarant’s prior statement when the  
party’s deliberate wrongdoing or acquiescence therein procured the unavailability 
of the declarant as a witness.  This recognizes the need for a prophylactic rule to 
deal with abhorrent behavior ‘which strikes at the heart of the system of justice 
itself.’  (citation omitted.) The wrongdoing need not consist of a criminal act.138
The intent of the rule is to preclude a defendant from benefiting from 
his wrongful prevention of future testimony from a witness or a potential 
witness.139  Usually, when a theory of law has a federal basis that 
construction of the law employed by the federal courts is adopted by the 
state court.140
 134. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 
(1945) (“Accordingly one’s misconduct need not necessarily have been of such a nature 
as to be punishable as a crime or as to justify legal proceedings of any character.”). 
 135. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee’s note (quoting Mastrangelo, 693 
F.2d at 273). 
 136. Infra note 141 and accompanying text; see also Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 
1193, 1201 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 137. Subdivision (b)(6) was added to Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 
December 1997 and provides: 
Rule 804.  Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable 
. . . . 
 
(b) Hearsay exceptions.  The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
 . . . .  
 
(6) Forfeiture by wrongdoing.  A statement offered against a party that has 
engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, 
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness. 
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (effective Dec. 1997). 
 138. FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note (quoting Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 
at 269, 273) (emphasis added). 
 139. United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 652 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 140. People v. Simon, 886 P.2d 1271, 1283 (1995) (“When a state statute is modeled 
on a federal statute we presume that the Legislature intended to adopt the construction 
employed by the federal courts.”) (citing L.A. Met. Transit Auth. v. Bhd. R.R. Trainmen, 
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Indeed, federal courts agree that wrongful conduct may include non-
criminal conduct such as the use of threats, coercion, chicanery, persuasion, 
control, intimidation, nondisclosure of information, directing a witness 
to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege, or as in Reynolds, refusing to 
disclose the whereabouts of a witness.141  As the Court in Magourik said 
about forfeiture, “It is not so much the severity of the behavior, but 
rather the intent underlying it and its effectiveness, that constitutes a 
waiver.”142  Therefore, for all of the above reasons, the outrageous conduct 
which forms the basis for the forfeiture doctrine need not be criminal. 
3. The Giles Extension Violates the Constitutional                              
Guarantee of Confrontation 
The forfeiture principle is distinct from the confrontation clause.  As 
shown, the doctrine is designed to prevent an accused from abusing the 
normal operation of the criminal justice system and perverting the 
protections put in place for his benefit.143  To extend the doctrine to 
cases where there is no evidence that the accused intended to prevent the 
witness from testifying at trial is to apply the doctrine where there is no 
equitable basis for its invocation.  Without the requisite mens rea the 
accused has not acted with the intent to benefit from his conduct.  In that 
situation, the accused has not waived his right of confrontation and the 
admission of an unavailable witness’s testimony which had not been 
subjected to cross-examination would be in contravention of the 
protections of the Constitution.  When there is no evidence the defendant 
has attempted to thwart the criminal justice system, equity jurisdiction 
does not exist. “A court of equity acts only when and as conscience 
commands.”144  Because there is no unconscionable behavior, the 
355 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1960)); People v. Butler, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150, 155-56 (1996); accord 
L.A. Metro. Transit Auth. v. Bhd. R.R. Trainmen, 355 P.2d 905, 907 (Cal. 1960). 
 141. Dhinsa, 243 F.2d at 651-53; Magouirk v. Warden, Winn Corr. Ctr., 237 F.3d. 
549, 554-55 (5th Cir. 2001); Geraci v. Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 668 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 
1271, 1279-83 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 788-89 (2d Cir. 
1984); Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272-73; Steele 684 F.2d at 1203; United States v. Balano, 
618 F.2d 624, 628-29 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358-59 
(8th Cir. 1976). 
 142. Magouirk, 237 F.3d at 554. 
 143. Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Houlihan, 92 
F.3d at 1280. 
 144. Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavation Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933); 
DeGarmo v. Goldman, 123 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1942). 




conduct is governed by the statutes in the Penal Code, constitutional law, 
and case law. 
As Crawford points out, there are two “inferences about the meaning 
of the Sixth Amendment.  First, the principal evil at which the Confrontation 
Clause was directed was . . . its use of ex parte examinations as evidence 
against the accused.”145  The second proposition is that the “Framers 
would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness 
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the 
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”146
If the Giles court is correct, then in all cases of murder, or other cases 
where the underlying charge makes the subject of that charge 
unavailable to testify in court, ex parte hearsay and untested statements 
by that witness would be admissible evidence in contravention of the 
dictates of Crawford. 
In place of the live testimony of an individual secondary evidence 
could be introduced.147  The trier of fact would not be able to view the 
demeanor of the witness, nor assess credibility on that basis, nor look for 
body language which may be meaningful, nor watch the witness in the 
presence of the person against whom the testimony is offered.148  
Moreover, nor would that testimony be tested by the time-honored craft 
of cross-examination—a technique meant to assist the search for truth.149
In effect, the accused would have lost his right of confrontation.  This 
cannot and should not be the law because the Sixth Amendment right 
 145. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004). 
 146. Id. at 53-54. 
 147. United States v. White, 116, F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Both the 
[Confrontation Clause] and [hearsay rule] incorporate a preference for testimony tested 
by cross-examination, given under oath with the attendant penalty for perjury, and 
uttered before a jury able to observe the witness’s demeanor.”); Steele, 684 F.3d at 1202 
(“The law prefers live testimony over hearsay, a preference designed to protect everyone, 
particularly the defendant.”). 
 148. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976). 
Nor should the law permit an accused to subvert a criminal prosecution by 
causing witnesses not to testify at trial who have, at the pretrial stage, disclosed 
information which is inculpatory as to the accused.  To permit the defendant to 
profit from such conduct would be contrary to public policy, common sense 
and the underlying purpose of the [C]onfrontation [C]lause. 
Id.; accord Magouirk v. Warden, Winn Corr. Ctr., 237 F.3d 549, 552 (5th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 815 (10th Cir. 2000); White, 116 F.3d at 911-12; 
Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279; United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982); 
United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 149. Smith v. Estelle, 569 F.2d 944, 946 (5th Cir. 1978). 
The right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure.  
It is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure the 
‘accuracy of the truth-determining process.’ (citation omitted) It is, indeed, ‘an 
essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this 
country’s constitutional goal.’ 
Id. (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). 
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enjoyed by a criminal defendant is a fundamental right essential to a fair 
trial in a criminal prosecution.150  “The central concern of the Confrontation 
Clause is to ensure the reliability of [that evidence] by subjecting it to 
rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier 
of fact.”151  When there is no evidence of chicanery, wrongdoing, or an 
intent to silence a prosecution witness, forfeiture simply does not apply 
and the application of the doctrine in that case is a denial of one’s 
constitutional rights and is simply wrong.  As stated earlier, rules of 
equity have no place in matters that are plainly covered by existing law, 
and courts are not free to interject equitable doctrines into areas covered 
by criminal jurisprudence.152  To do otherwise would be in direct 
violation of what Crawford and its historical origins mandates. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Before a court may apply the forfeiture doctrine, an accused, or one at 
his behest, must have committed a wrongful act which prevented a 
prosecution witness from testifying at his trial.  That wrongful act, which 
need not be criminal, must have been committed with the intent that the 
person be unavailable to the prosecution to testify at the defendant’s 
trial.  If as a result of the defendant’s wrongdoing, the prosecution must 
resort to the use of extrajudicial statements of that witness, then the 
forfeiture doctrine applies to prevent the accused from obtaining an 
unfair legal advantage. 
As shown, the Giles extension of the doctrine is incompatible with the 
Reynolds formulation and with the federal courts who have applied 
forfeiture, ignores its equitable heritage, and is inconsistent with the 
federal rule of evidence which codifies the doctrine.  Moreover, to extend 
the doctrine to cases, such as Giles, where the absence of the requisite 
mens rea results in a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
of confrontation under Crawford. 
The right enjoyed by a criminal defendant to confront witnesses 
against him is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal 
prosecution and it is designed to secure for the defendant an opportunity 
 150. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986). 
 151. Tilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1999); see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400, 406 (1965). 
 152. 11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 681-82 (9th ed. 1990); 
Timberlane Inc. v. Jaisinghani, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4, 9 n.5 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting 
Gardiner v. Solder Co. v. SupAlloy Corp., 284 Cal. Rptr. 206, 210 (Ct. App. 1991)). 




of cross-examination.153  The fact that a statement comes within a 
hearsay exception does not change the fact that a defendant’s right of 
confrontation has been violated.  As Crawford points out, the ultimate 
goal of the Clause—reliable evidence—is not a substantive guarantee 
but a procedural guarantee.154  “It commands, not that evidence be 
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing 
in the crucible of cross-examination.”155
Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to 
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.  This is not 
what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.156
The Giles extension would result in a procedure specifically eschewed 
by Crawford.  It would allow “a jury to hear evidence, untested by the 
adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability.”157  
Thus, it would “[replace] the constitutionally prescribed method of 
assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one”158 not prescribed by the 
Constitution. 
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers [of the 
Constitution] meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries 
of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of reliability. . . .  
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with 
the right of confrontation.159
The Giles extension would allow the use of ex parte hearsay 
statements as evidence against the accused.  It would also allow untested 
testimonial statements of unavailable witnesses—statements which the 
defendant has not had an opportunity to test and challenge by cross-
examination.  This result is exactly what Crawford states the Sixth 
Amendment was intended to prevent.160 
The forfeiture doctrine, however, is an exception to the requirements 
of confrontation.  It says nothing about reliability because it is not intended 
to be used to assess reliability.  Application of the doctrine is an equitable 
punishment which extinguishes an accused’s right of confrontation.  It 
divests the defendant of his right to raise those objections to the 
admission of the secondary hearsay evidence because of his wrongful 
conduct and mens rea. 
 153. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 401. 
 154. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 62. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 61. 
 160. Id. at 50-56. 
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However, if there are no equitable grounds which command its 
application, then any attempt to implement its censure results in a denial 
of Sixth Amendment rights when such censure is unwarranted.161  Hence, 
the extension of the forfeiture doctrine as contemplated by the Giles 
Court would result in the denial of a defendant’s constitutional right to 
confront witnesses in violation of Crawford and Reynolds.  In an attempt 
to implement the Crawford forfeiture exception, the Giles extension 
results in a violation of what Crawford commands—confrontation.  For 






























 161. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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